



dnata Risk Register EBL

Department & Main Activity			Security Threats		
Ref No.	Risk Identification date	Activity / Process Project / Task Equipment / Facility	Risk or Opportunity Statement If (event) then (consequence)	Trigger/Cause Hazard/Source	Existing Control Measures

1	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED)	<p>1. An attack targeting the general population and infrastructure in Erbil and dnata staff / assets suffer collateral harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. Between 01/01/21 & 02/06/23 there have been 6 recorded VBIED attack within 1.5 hours drive of Erbil. There remains the capability and capacity to undertake this type of attack within Erbil.</p>	<p>1. EBL IMT have received training on how to respond to a VBIED attack. 2. EBL staff reside in several dispersed accommodation venues. 3. EBL staff take different routes to EBL. 4. Significant security arrangements leading up to and in EBL. 5. General EBL staff informed they are allowed out for essential matters only. 6. All EBL staff will undertake personal routine in different locations. 7. EBL expat staff are not to travel beyond the check points of Erbil without prior management authority. 8. A Security Assessment is conducted prior to visiting specific locations e.g. restaurants etc. 9. Park View accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier with ANPR. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. • Entrances with electronic access locks. 10. Four Towers accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. • Entrances with electronic access locks. 11. Empire accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Unarmed security on all entrances supported by armed roving patrols. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. 12. Atconz accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. 13. EBL staff have the AlertMedia App to notify them of a security risk.</p>
		<p>1. An attack targeting dnata staff and assets resulting in harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious</p>	<p>1. There is no information / intelligence to suggest that dnata are a specific target for attack.</p>	

2	Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED)	<p>1. An attack targeting the general population and infrastructure in Erbil and dnata staff / assets suffer collateral harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. Between 01/01/21 & 02/06/23 there have been 4 recorded attempted PBIED attacks within 1.5 hours drive of Erbil. This demonstrates that there is the capability and capacity to undertake this type of attack within Erbil.</p>	<p>1. EBL IMT have received training on how to respond to a PBIED attack. 2. EBL staff reside in several dispersed accommodation venues. 3. EBL staff take different routes to EBL. 4. Significant security arrangements leading up and in EBL. 5. General EBL staff informed they are allowed out for essential matters only. 6. All EBL staff will undertake personal routine in different locations. 7. EBL expat staff are not to travel beyond the check points of Erbil without prior management authority. 8. A Security Assessment is conducted prior to visiting specific locations e.g. restaurants etc. 9. Park View accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier with ANPR. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. • Entrances with electronic access locks. </p> <p>10. Four Towers accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. • Entrances with electronic access locks. </p> <p>11. Empire accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Unarmed security on all entrances supported by armed roving patrols. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. </p> <p>12. Atconz accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • No vehicle barrier but armed vehicle check point. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. </p> <p>13. EBL staff have the AlertMedia App to notify them of a security risk.</p>
		<p>1. An attack targeting dnata staff and assets resulting in harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. There is no information / intelligence to suggest that dnata are a specific target for attack.</p>	

3	Improvised Explosive Device (IED)	<p>1. An attack targeting the general population and infrastructure in Erbil and dnata staff / assets suffer collateral harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. Between 01/01/21 & 02/06/23 there have been 112 recorded IED attacks within 1.5 hours drive of Erbil. This demonstrates that there is the capability and capacity to undertake this type of attack within Erbil.</p>	<p>1. EBL IMT have received training on how to respond to an IED attack. 2. EBL staff reside in several dispersed accommodation venues. 3. EBL staff take different routes to EBL. 4. Significant security arrangements leading up to and in EBL. 5. General EBL staff informed they are only allowed out for essential matters. 6. All EBL staff will undertake personal routine in different locations. 7. EBL expat staff are not to travel beyond the check points of Erbil without prior management authority. 8. A Security Assessment is conducted prior to visiting specific locations e.g. restaurants etc. 9. Park View accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier with ANPR. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. • Entrances with electronic access locks. </p> <p>10. Four Towers accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. • Entrances with electronic access locks. </p> <p>11. Empire accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Unarmed security on all entrances supported by armed roving patrols. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. </p> <p>12. Atconz accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. </p> <p>13. EBL staff have the AlertMedia App to notify them of a security risk.</p>
		<p>1. An attack targeting dnata staff and assets resulting in harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. There is no information / intelligence to suggest that dnata are a specific target for attack.</p>	

4	Close Quarter Attack	<p>1. An attack targeting the general population and infrastructure in Erbil and dnata staff / assets suffer collateral harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. Between 01/01/21 & 02/06/23 there have been 141 recorded Close Quarter Attacks within 1.5 hours drive of Erbil, with one attack thwarted in Erbil. This demonstrates that there is the capability and capacity to undertake this type of attack within Erbil.</p>	<p>1. EBL IMT have received training on how to respond to a Close Quarter Attack. 2. EBL staff reside in several dispersed accommodation venues. 3. EBL staff take different routes to EBL. 4. Significant security arrangements leading up to and in EBL. 5. General EBL staff informed they are allowed out for essential matters only. 6. All EBL staff will undertake personal routine in different locations. 7. EBL expat staff are not to travel beyond the check points of Erbil without prior management authority. 8. A Security Assessment is conducted prior to visiting specific locations e.g. restaurants etc. 9. Park View accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier with ANPR. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. • Entrances with electronic access locks. </p> <p>10. Four Towers accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. • Entrances with electronic access locks. </p> <p>11. Empire accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Unarmed security on all entrances supported by armed roving patrols. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. </p> <p>12. Atconz accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. </p> <p>13. EBL staff have the AlertMedia App to notify them of a security risk.</p>
		<p>1. An attack targeting dnata staff and assets resulting in harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. There is no information / intelligence to suggest that dnata are a specific target for attack.</p>	

5	Momentum Attack (car / lorry)	<p>1. An attack targeting the general population and infrastructure in Erbil and dnata staff / assets suffer collateral harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. Between 01/01/21 & 02/06/23 there have been no recorded Momentum Attacks within 1.5 hours drive of Erbil. This demonstrates that even though this is a effective attack method, other attack methods are preferred within the area of concern.</p>	<p>1. EBL staff reside in several dispersed accommodation venues. 2. Significant security arrangements leading up and in EBL. 3. General EBL staff informed they are allowed out for essential matters only. 4. All EBL staff will undertake personal routine in different locations. 5. A Security Assessment is conducted prior to visiting specific locations e.g. restaurants etc. 6. Park View accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier with ANPR. </p> <p>7. Four Towers accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier. </p> <p>8. Empire accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Unarmed security on all entrances supported by armed roving patrols. • Vehicle barrier. </p> <p>9. Atconz accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier. </p> <p>10. EBL staff have the AlertMedia App to notify them of a security risk.</p>
		<p>1. An attack targeting dnata staff and assets resulting in harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. There is no information / intelligence to suggest that dnata are a specific target for attack.</p>	
6	Direct Fire (sniper)	<p>1. An attack targeting the general population and infrastructure in Erbil and dnata staff / assets suffer collateral harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. Between 01/01/21 & 02/06/23 there have been 6 recorded Direct Fire attack within 1.5 hours drive of Erbil. This demonstrates that there is the capability and capacity to undertake this type of attack within Erbil.</p>	<p>1. EBL IMT have received training on how to respond to a Direct Fire attack. 2. EBL staff reside in several dispersed accommodation venues. 3. EBL staff take different routes to EBL. 4. Significant security arrangements leading up to and in EBL. 5. General EBL staff informed they are allowed out for essential matters only. 6. All EBL staff will undertake personal routine in different locations. 7. EBL expat staff are not to travel beyond the check points of Erbil without prior management authority. 8. A Security Assessment is conducted prior to visiting specific locations e.g. restaurants etc. 9. All EBL vehicles have no dnata insignia. 10. EBL IMT are aware of the identified safe havens. 11. EBL IMT do not wear dnata uniform until they reach EBL. 12. General EBL staff have been instructed the not to wear uniform outside of work. 13. EBL staff have the AlertMedia App to notify them of a security risk.</p>

			<p>1. An attack targeting dnata staff and assets resulting in harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. There is no information / intelligence to suggest that dnata are a specific target for attack.</p>	
7	Indirect Fire (RPG / grenade / mortar)		<p>1. An attack targeting the general population and infrastructure in Erbil and dnata staff / assets suffer collateral harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>Between 01/01/21 & 02/06/23 there have been 23 recorded Indirect Fire attacks within 1.5 hours drive of Erbil. This demonstrates that there is the capability and capacity to undertake this type of attack within Erbil.</p>	<p>1. EBL IMT have received training on how to respond to a Direct Fire attack. 2. EBL staff reside in several dispersed accommodation venues. 3. EBL staff take different routes to EBL. 4. Significant security arrangements leading up to and in EBL. 5. General EBL staff informed they are allowed out for essential matters only. 6. All EBL staff will undertake personal routine in different locations. 7. EBL expat staff are not to travel beyond the check points of Erbil without prior management authority. 8. A Security Assessment is conducted prior to visiting specific locations e.g. restaurants etc. 9. All EBL vehicles have no dnata insignia. 10. EBL IMT are aware of the identified safe havens. 11. EBL staff have the AlertMedia App to notify them of a security risk.</p>
			<p>1. An attack targeting dnata staff and assets resulting in harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. There is no information / intelligence to suggest that dnata are a specific target for attack.</p>	
			<p>1. An attack targeting the general population and infrastructure in Erbil and dnata staff / assets suffer</p>	<p>1. Between 01/01/21 & 02/06/23 there have been 9 recorded UAV attacks, 4 within Erbil and 2 with 1.5</p>	<p>1. EBL staff reside in several accommodation venues. 2. EBL staff work in different locations within EBL. 3. EBL staff have the AlertMedia App to notify them of a security risk.</p>

8	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)	<p>collateral harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>hours drive of Erbil. This demonstrates that there is the capability and capacity to undertake this type of attack within Erbil.</p>	
		<p>1. An attack targeting dnata staff and assets resulting in harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. There is no information / intelligence to suggest that dnata are a specific target for attack.</p>	
9	Missile Strikes	<p>1. An attack targeting the general population and infrastructure in Erbil and dnata staff / assets suffer collateral harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. Between 01/01/21 & 02/06/23 there have been 42 recorded Missile Strikes, 3 within Erbil and 6 within 1.5 hours drive of Erbil. This demonstrates that there is the capability and capacity to undertake this type of attack within Erbil.</p>	<p>1. EBL IMT have received training on how to respond to a Missile Strike. 2. EBL staff reside in several dispersed accommodation venues. 3. EBL staff take different routes to EBL. 4. Significant security arrangements leading up to and in EBL. 5. General EBL staff informed they are allowed out for essential matters only. 6. All EBL staff will undertake personal routine in different locations. 7. EBL expat staff are not to travel beyond the check points of Erbil without prior management authority. 8. A Security Assessment is conducted prior to visiting specific locations e.g. restaurants etc. 9. EBL staff work in different locations within EBL. 10. EBL staff have the AlertMedia App to notify them of a security risk.</p>
		<p>1. An attack targeting dnata staff and assets resulting in harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. There is no information / intelligence to suggest that dnata are a specific target for attack.</p>	

10	Kidnap	<p>1. An attack targeting the general population and infrastructure in Erbil and dnata staff / assets suffer collateral harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	<p>1. Between 01/01/21 & 02/06/23 there have been 19 recorded Kidnappings within 1.5 hours drive of Erbil. This demonstrates that there is the capability and capacity to undertake this type of attack within Erbil.</p>	<p>1. EBL IMT have received training on how to respond to a Kidnap. 2. EBL staff reside in several dispersed accommodation venues. 3. EBL staff take different routes to EBL. 4. Significant security arrangements leading up to and in EBL. 5. General EBL staff informed they are allowed out for essential matters only. 6. All EBL staff will undertake personal routine in different locations. 7. EBL expat staff are not to travel beyond the check points of Erbil without prior management authority. 8. A Security Assessment is conducted prior to visiting specific locations e.g. restaurants etc. 9. All EBL vehicles have no dnata insignia. 10. EBL IMT do not wear dnata uniform until they reach EBL. 11. General EBL staff have been instructed the not to wear uniform outside of work. 12. EBL IMT are aware of the identified safe havens. 13. EBL IMT vary their work times. 14. Park View accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier with ANPR. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. • Entrances with electronic access locks. 15. Four Towers accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. • Entrances with electronic access locks. 16. Empire accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Unarmed security on all entrances supported by armed roving patrols. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. 17. Atconz accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. 18. EBL staff have the AlertMedia App to notify them of a security risk.</p>
		<p>1. An attack targeting dnata staff and assets resulting in harm / damage. 2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious</p>	<p>1. There is no information / intelligence to suggest that dnata are a specific target for attack.</p>	

11	Civil Unrest (protests / demonstrations)	1. An attack targeting the general population and infrastructure in Erbil and dnata staff / assets suffer collateral harm / damage.	1. Between 01/01/21 & 02/06/23 there have been 125 recorded Civil Unrest incidents within 1.5 hours drive of Erbil.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EBL IMT have received training on how to respond to Civil Unrest. 2. EBL staff reside in several dispersed accommodation venues. 3. EBL staff take different routes to EBL. 4. Significant security arrangements leading up to and in EBL. 5. General EBL staff informed they are allowed out for essential matters only. 6. All EBL staff will undertake personal routine in different locations. 7. EBL expat staff are not to travel beyond the check points of Erbil without prior management authority. 8. A Security Assessment is conducted prior to visiting specific locations e.g. restaurants etc. 9. All EBL vehicles have no dnata insignia. 10. EBL IMT do not wear dnata uniform until they reach EBL. 11. General EBL staff have been instructed the not to wear uniform outside of work. 12. EBL IMT are aware of the identified safe havens. 13. Park View accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier with ANPR. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. • Entrances with electronic access locks. 14. Four Towers accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. • Entrances with electronic access locks. 15. Empire accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Unarmed security on all entrances supported by armed roving patrols. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. 16. Atconz accommodation has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security fencing. • Armed security on all entrances. • Vehicle barrier. • 24/7 monitored CCTV. 17. EBL staff have the AlertMedia App to notify them of a security risk.
		1. An attack targeting dnata staff and assets resulting in harm / damage.	1. There is no information / intelligence to suggest that dnata are	

12	Security Training – EBL IMT / DBX CMT	<p>1. Without the correct training, dnata staff will not be able to: identify any developing security risks; respond effectively to a security incident; appreciate what decisions need to be taken to mitigate a security risk; and identify the additional resources required. This could increase the risk of harm to EBL staff.</p> <p>2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	1. Risks as detailed at ref 1 - 11.	<p>1. EBL IMT have received 1 days annual security training.</p> <p>2. Some members of DBX CMT have received 1 days security training.</p>
	First Aid Training – EBL General Staff / EBL IMT	<p>1. Without the correct training, EBL staff will not be able to respond to a security incident which has resulted in harm.</p> <p>2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	1. Risks as detailed at ref 1 - 11.	<p>1. Some Supervisor's, Team Leaders and Managers are trained in first aid. There are First Aid responders in every department (Ramp, Cargo, Customer Service and Admin). 6 of them reside in Four Towers, 1 in KGL, 3 are in Park View, 1 in Empire, 1 in Atconz, and 1 is outside the accommodation.</p>
	Induction Process	<p>1. Newly recruited EBL staff need to have the requisite information prior to arrival in Erbil to enable them to respond immediately to a security incident in order to reduce their risk of harm.</p> <p>2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be serious injury / fatality.</p>	1. Risks as detailed at ref 1 - 11.	<p>1. New joiners complete a safety induction which includes Fire Safety, Emergency Evacuation, Location of Assembly Points and Airport Security.</p>
	Visitors	<p>1. Visitors to EBL need to have the requisite information prior to arrival in Erbil to enable them to respond immediately to a security incident in order to reduce their risk of harm.</p> <p>2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be serious injury / fatality.</p>	1. Risks as detailed at ref 1 - 11.	<p>1. Visitors are placed in a hotel with identified security arrangements in place.</p> <p>2. Visitors are provided with a 'go bag' for their stay in Erbil.</p>
	Movements Scheduled	<p>1. Any movement outside of an EBL accommodation venue or EBL increases the risk of harm to a member of the EBL staff. If this movement is predictable then it further increases the risk of a security incident occurring.</p> <p>2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	1. Risks as detailed at ref 1 - 11.	<p>1. EBL IMT have received training reducing predictability and their visibility.</p> <p>2. EBL staff reside in several dispersed accommodation venues.</p> <p>3. EBL staff take different routes to EBL.</p> <p>4. All EBL vehicles have no dnata insignia.</p> <p>5. EBL IMT vary their work times.</p>

	Movements Unscheduled	<p>1. Any movement outside of an EBL accommodation venue or EBL increases the risk of harm to a member of the EBL staff.</p> <p>2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	1. Risks as detailed at ref 1 - 11.	<p>1. EBL IMT have received training to reduce their predictability and visibility.</p> <p>2. EBL staff reside in several dispersed accommodation venues.</p> <p>3. EBL staff take different routes to EBL.</p> <p>4. General EBL staff informed they are allowed out for essential matters only.</p> <p>6. All EBL staff will undertake personal routine in different locations.</p> <p>7. EBL expat staff are not to travel beyond the check points of Erbil without prior management authority.</p> <p>8. All EBL vehicles have no dnata insignia.</p> <p>9. EBL IMT do not wear dnata uniform until they reach EBL.</p> <p>10. General EBL staff have been instructed the not to wear uniform outside of work.</p> <p>11. EBL staff have the AlertMedia App to notify them of a security risk.</p>
	Behaviour Outside Work	<p>1. Whilst outside of work, EBL staff increase their risk of harm resulting from a security incident by how they act, where they frequent and who they socialise with.</p> <p>2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	1. Risks as detailed at ref 1 - 11.	<p>1. EBL IMT have received training on how to reduce their risks whilst outside of work.</p> <p>2. General EBL staff informed they are allowed out for essential matters only.</p> <p>3. All EBL staff will undertake personal routine in different locations.</p> <p>4. EBL expat staff are not to travel beyond the check points of Erbil without prior management authority.</p> <p>5. All EBL vehicles have no dnata insignia.</p> <p>6. EBL IMT do not wear dnata uniform until they reach EBL.</p> <p>7. General EBL staff have been instructed the not to wear uniform outside of work.</p> <p>8. EBL staff have the AlertMedia App to notify them of a security risk.</p>
	Vehicles	<p>1. The vehicles used by EBL staff to travel to and from work, plus for recreational use can increase their visibility and consequently their risk to a security incident resulting in harm.</p> <p>2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	1. Risks as detailed at ref 1 - 11.	1. All EBL vehicles have no dnata insignia.
	Equipment	<p>1. In the event of a security incident, inadequate equipment will increase the risk of harm.</p> <p>2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	1. Risks as detailed at ref 1 - 11.	<p>1. EBL General Managers have the duty mangers bag with key communication equipment and information.</p> <p>2. EBL visitors are provided with a grab bag with key communication equipment.</p>
	Communications	<p>1. In the event of a security incident, inadequate communication systems will increase the risk of harm.</p> <p>2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	1. Risks as detailed at ref 1 - 11.	<p>1. EBL staff have the AlertMedia App to notify them of a security risk.</p> <p>2. EBL Duty Managers have the number to AKE 24/7 Crisis Response Centre.</p> <p>3. EBL General Managers have direct access to AKE Operations Director 24/7.</p> <p>4. All EBL Mangers have access to overlapping communication equipment i.e. Mobile Phones, Sat Phones, Radios.</p>

	Venue Security Assessments	<p>1. In the event of a security incident at a venue, inadequate security measures will increase the risk of harm.</p> <p>2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	1. Risks as detailed at ref 1 - 11.	1. EBL managers undertake a Security and Fire Safety Risk Assessment of all accommodation venues and locations where pre-planned visits will occur.
	Standard Operating Procedures	<p>1. In the event of a security incident, inadequate Standard Operating Procedures will increase the risk of harm.</p> <p>2. Due to the nature of the risks the harm could be multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p>	1. Risks as detailed at ref 1 - 11.	1. EBL / DBX Managers have access to the current Standard Operating Procedure for Evacuation.

Risk Assessment Team														
TREATMENT ACTIONS														
Mitigations / controls to modify the risk														
Residual Risk														
Risk Evaluation	Consequence (C)	Likelihood (L)	Inherent Risk Rating(C*L)	Risk Control Effectiveness (S/U)	Recommended Mitigations to further reduce this risk	Risk Owner	Risk Manager	Risk Treatment Start Date	Risk Treatment Type	Closure date	Consequence	Likelihood	Residual Risk (C*L)	Comments
People Environment Asset Operation Reputation Financial														

People	5	C	5C	<p>1. Train and/or provide key information to the EBL general staff on how to respond to a VBIED attack.</p> <p>2. Train key EBL staff at each venue in trauma first aid and provide them with a trauma kit to ensure 24/7 response.</p> <p>3. SOP with check list for increased threat / risk level.</p> <p>4. Identify high risk venues and inform staff they are 'no go' locations.</p> <p>5. Undertake security assessments for risks, 5C and above, at each of the accommodation venues and implement control measures if required / possible.</p>				Mitigate		5	C	5C	<p>1. A well planned VBIED attack could take place within the locality of a venue and due to the scale of the explosion cause multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p> <p>2. The control measures will seek to mitigate the risk of EBL staff suffering collateral harm of multiple serious injuries / fatalities, but it will not avoid or transfer the risk.</p>
Asset	5	C	5C	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	C	5C	<p>1. The accommodation venues are rented. Therefore new accommodation can be secured.</p> <p>2. Total loss of a vehicle is not significant. Therefore a replacement vehicle can be secured.</p> <p>3. Any total loss of assets at EBL will have to be replaced to ensure business continuity once EBL was fully operational.</p>
People	5	A	5A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	A	5A	
Asset	4	A	4A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		4	A	4A	

People	5	C	5C	1. Train and/or provide key information to the EBL general staff on how to respond to a PBIED attack. 2. Train key EBL staff at each venue in trauma first aid and provide them with a trauma kit to ensure 24/7 response. 3. SOP with check list for increased threat / risk level. 4. Identify high risk locations and inform staff they are 'no go' locations. 5. Undertake security assessments for risks, 5C and above, at each of the accommodation venues and implement control measures if required / possible.				Mitigate		5	C	5C	1. A PBIED is a highly flexible and effective attack. The attacker can carry the device on their person in the form of an explosive vest, bag or rucksack. They can select their mass casualty target at random and activate the attack which will cause multiple serious injuries / fatalities. 2. The control measures will seek to mitigate the risk of EBL staff suffering collateral harm of multiple serious injuries / fatalities, but it will not avoid or transfer the risk.
Asset	4	C	4C	None recommended at this time.				Accept		4	C	4C	
People	5	A	5A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	A	5A	
Asset	4	A	4A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		4	A	4A	

People	5	C	5C	<p>1. Train and/or provide key information to the EBL general staff on how to respond to an IED attack.</p> <p>2. Train key EBL staff at each venue in trauma first aid and provide them with a trauma kit to ensure 24/7 response.</p> <p>3. SOP with check list for increased threat / risk level.</p> <p>4. Identify high risk venues and inform staff they are 'no go' locations.</p> <p>5. Undertake security assessments for risks, 5C and above, at each of the accommodation venues and implement control measures if required / possible.</p>				Mitigate		5	C	5C	<p>1. An IED could easily be placed undetected in a key location within Erbil and cause multiple serious injuries / fatalities.</p> <p>2. The control measures will seek to mitigate the risk of EBL staff suffering collateral harm of multiple serious injuries / fatalities, but it will not avoid or transfer the risk.</p>
Asset	5	C	5C	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	C	5C	<p>1. The accommodation venues are rented. Therefore new accommodation can be secured.</p> <p>2. Total loss of a vehicle is not significant. Therefore a replacement vehicle can be secured.</p> <p>3. Any total loss of assets at EBL will have to be replaced to ensure business continuity once EBL was fully operational.</p>
People	5	A	5A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	A	5A	
Asset	5	A	5A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	A	5A	

People	5	C	5C	1. Train and/or provide key information to the EBL general staff on how to respond to a Close Quarter Attack. 2. Train key EBL staff at each venue in trauma first aid and provide them with a trauma kit to ensure 24/7 response. 3. SOP with check list for increased threat / risk level. 4. Identify high risk venues and inform stay they are 'no go' locations. 5. Undertake security assessments for risks, 5C and above, at each of the accommodation venues and implement control measures if required / possible.				Mitigate		5	C	5C	1. A well planned Close Quarter Attack involving highly motivated, armed and experienced attackers within a urban environment is extremely difficult to prevent or neutralise with a short time frame before they cause multiple serious injuries / fatalities. 2. The control measures will seek to mitigate the risk of EBL staff suffering collateral harm of multiple serious injuries / fatalities, but it will not avoid or transfer the risk.
Asset	4	C	4C	None recommended at this time.				Accept		4	C	4C	
People	5	A	5A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	A	5A	
Asset	4	A	4A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		4	A	4A	

People	5	A	5A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	A	5A	
Asset	2	A	2A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		2	A	2A	
People	5	A	5A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	A	5A	
Asset	2	A	2A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		2	A	2A	
People	5	C	5C	1. Train and/or provide key information to the EBL general staff on how to respond to a Direct Fire attack. 2. Train key EBL staff at each venue in trauma first aid and provide them with a trauma kit to ensure 24/7 response. 3. SOP with check list for increased threat / risk level. 4. Identify high risk venues and inform staff they are 'no go' locations. 5. Undertake security assessments for risks, 5C and above, at each of the accommodation venues and implement control measures if required / possible.				Mitigate		5	C	5C	1. A trained sniper with the correct weapon and ammunition can cause serious harm up to 1000m. Within an urban environment they are difficult to locate and neutralise before they can cause multiple serious injuries / fatalities. 2. The control measures will seek to mitigate the risk of EBL staff suffering collateral harm of multiple serious injuries / fatalities, but it will not avoid or transfer the risk.
Asset	1	C	1C	None recommended at this time.				Accept		1	C	1C	

People	5	A	5A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	A	5A	
Asset	1	A	1A	None recommended at this time.						1	A	1A	
People	5	C	5C	<p>1. Train and/or provide key information to the EBL general staff on how to respond to an Indirect Fire attack.</p> <p>2. Train key EBL staff at each venue in trauma first aid and provide them with a trauma kit to ensure 24/7 response.</p> <p>3. SOP with check list for increased threat / risk level.</p> <p>4. Identify high risk venues and inform stay they are 'no go' locations.</p> <p>5. Undertake security assessments for risks, 5C and above, at each of the accommodation venues and implement control measures if required / possible.</p>				Mitigate		5	C	5C	<p>1. Indirect fire attacks focus on a specific target and can be launched from within an urban environment with relative ease e.g. grenades and RPG. They also can be launched from the outskirts of a city in the case of a mortar. Whichever option, the nature of the weapons involved means that they result in wide spread collateral damage and multiple serious injuries and fatalities.</p> <p>2. The control measures will seek to mitigate the risk of EBL staff suffering collateral harm of multiple serious injuries / fatalities, but it will not avoid or transfer the risk.</p>
Asset	5	C	5C	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	C	5C	<p>1. The accommodation venues are rented. Therefore new accommodation can be secured.</p> <p>2. Total loss of a vehicle is not significant. Therefore a replacement vehicle can be secured.</p> <p>3. Any total loss of assets at EBL will have to be replaced to ensure business continuity once EBL was fully operational.</p>
People	5	A	5A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	A	5A	
Asset	5	A	5A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	A	5A	
People	5	B	5B	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	A	5A	

Asset	4	B	4B	None recommended at this time.				Accept		4	A	4A	
People	5	A	5A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	A	5A	
Asset	4	A	4A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		4	A	4A	
People	5	E	5E	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Train and/or provide key information to the EBL general staff on how to respond to a Missile Strike. 2. Train key EBL staff at each venue in trauma first aid and provide them with a trauma kit to ensure 24/7 response. 3. SOP with check list for increased threat / risk level. 4. Identify high risk venues and inform staff they are 'no go' locations. 5. Undertake security assessments for risks, 5C and above, at each of the accommodation venues and implement control measures if required / possible. 				Accept		5	E	5E	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Missile strikes can vary from those launched from the back of vehicles (can be inaccurate) through to short range inter ballistic missiles (very accurate). The nature of these weapons this that they are designed to deliver highly significant impacts resulting in multiple injuries and fatalities. 2. The control measures will seek to mitigate the risk of EBL staff suffering collateral harm of multiple serious injuries / fatalities, but it has to be accepted that any missile strike on a venue containing EBL staff will result in significant loss of life.
Asset	5	E	5E	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ensure appropriate structural measurers are put in place for new accommodation of EBL. 				Accept		5	E	5E	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The accommodation venues are rented. Therefore new accommodation can be secured. 2. Total loss of a vehicle is not significant. Therefore a replacement vehicle can be secured. 3. Any total loss of assets at EBL will have to be replaced to ensure business continuity once EBL was fully operational.
People	5	A	5A	None recommended at this time.				Accept		5	A	5A	
Asset	5	A	5A	None recommended at this time.						5	A	5A	

People	4	A	4A		None recommended at this time.					Accept		4	A	4A	
Financial	4	A	4A		None recommended at this time.					Accept		4	A	4A	
People	4	A	4A		None recommended at this time.					Accept		4	A	4A	
Financial	4	A	4A		None recommended at this time.					Accept		4	A	4A	

People	2	D	2D		None recommended at this time.				Accept		2	B	2D	
Asset	2	D	2D		None recommended at this time.				Accept		2	B	2B	
People	2	A	2A		None recommended at this time.				Accept		2	A	2A	
Asset	2	A	2A		None recommended at this time.				Accept		2	A	2A	

People	5	C	5C	1. All EDL IMT to undergo 2 days annual security training. 2. Identified members of DBX CMT to undergo 2 days annual security training.				Mitigate		5	C	5C	1. With the appropriate training, staff will have the required knowledge and will be able to effectively respond to a security incident. However, due to the nature of the risks as detailed at ref 1-11 the training will not not mitigate them, but will help reduce the effects if the incident if managed by those with the requisite knowledge.
People	5	C	5C	1. Train key EBL staff at each venue in trauma first aid and provide them with a trauma kit to ensure 24/7 response.				Mitigate		5	C	5C	1. The risk as detailed at ref 1 - 11 are significant in that they could result in multiple serious injuries / fatalities. Training staff in trauma first aid may reduce the number of fatalities and the effects of serious injury, but it will not prevent them occurring.
People	4	C	4C	1. All EBL new joiners to receive a security briefing pack prior to arrival in EBL.				Mitigate		4	B	4B	1. Even with providing the required information, a member of staff may choose not to read the information and place themselves at risk.
People	4	C	4C	1. All EBL visitors to receive a security briefing pack prior to arrival in EBL. 2. Visitors to be escorted at all times by and experienced member of EBL staff.				Mitigate		4	B	4B	1. Even with providing the required information, a member of staff may choose not to read the information and place themselves at risk.
People	5	C	5C	1. Train and/or provide key information to the EBL general staff on how to reduce their predictability and visibility. 2. Alternate routes into EBL to be identified. 3. Identify options for 'slip shifts' to reduce predictability. 4. Vehicles to be the most common make, model and colour used in Erbil.				Mitigate		5	C	5C	1. EBL have to move the staff from their accommodation to EBL. If a significant incident occurred, due to the numbers of staff in a vehicle it will result in multiple serious injuries / fatalities.

People	4	C	4C	1. Train and/or provide key information to the EBL general staff on how to reduce their predictability and visibility. 2. Vehicles to be the most common make, model and colour used in Erbil.				Mitigate		4	B	4C	1. By training and/or providing the relevant information to all staff it will reduce the risk that several members of staff at once will ignore the guidance, but there is still the possibility that in certain circumstances they will.
People	5	C	5C	1. Train and/or provide key information to the EBL general staff on how to reduce their risk whilst outside of work.				Mitigate		4	C	4C	1. By training and/or providing the relevant information to all staff it will reduce the risk that several members of staff at once will ignore the guidance, but there is still the possibility that in certain circumstances they will.
People	5	C	5C	1. Vehicles to be the most common make, model and colour used in Erbil. 2. Remove the identifying number from the vehicles transporting EBL general staff to and from EBL.				Mitigate		5	C	5C	1. EBL have to move the staff from their accommodation to EBL. If a significant incident occurred, due to the numbers of staff in a vehicle it will result in multiple serious injuries / fatalities.
People	5	B	5B	1. Provide key EBL staff with trauma first aid kits.				Mitigate		5	B	5B	1. The risk as detailed in ref 1 - 11 are significant in that they could result in multiple serious injuries / fatalities. Training staff in trauma first aid may reduce the number of fatalities and the effects of serious injury, but it will not prevent them occurring.
People	4	C	4C	1. Add all visitors to the AlertMedia App.				Mitigate		4	B	4B	1. Even with providing the required information, a member of staff may choose to ignore the AlertMedia and place themselves at risk.

People	5	C	5C		1. Update the Risk Assessment Template to include risks as detailed at ref 1 - 11.				Mitigate		5	C	5C	1. A comprehensive risk assessment will identify where the security arrangements need improving, which may not be possible. Furthermore, depending on the nature of the incident they may not prevent it occurring and the subsequently harm it may cause.
People	5	C	5C		1. Update the Standard Operating Procedure to include risks as detailed at ref 1 - 11.				Mitigate		5	C	5C	1. Standard Operating Procedures will reduce the risk of a security incident occurring or mitigating the staffs exposure to harm. However, due to the nature of the risks at ref 1-11 it will not prevent multiple serious injuries / fatalities.