Date first published: 24/07/2025
Key sectors: all; oil and gas
Key risks: politic violence; violent clashes; economic risks; business risks; targeted attacks
Risk development
On 13 July the Cano Limon-Covenas Oil Pipeline was bombed by unidentified assailants in Saravena, Arauca department, prompting the suspension of pumping between oil fields in the northeast and the Caribbean coast. Operator Cenit, a subsidiary of the majority-state-owned oil company Ecopetrol, stated that it activated a contingency plan to control spills and environmental contamination. Although unclaimed, dissident former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels and National Liberation Army (ELN) rebels are known to operate in the area.
The incident followed a similar incident on 3 July, when an explosive attack targeted the Bicentenario pipeline, in Tame, Arauca department, suspending its operations. This marked the sixth such attack in 2025.
Why it matters
The recent string of attacks on oil infrastructure underscores the limitations of President Gustavo Petro’s ambitious ‘total peace’ agenda, amid surging violence and repeated breakdowns of ceasefires and stalled peace talks with the ELN and dissident former FARC rebels. Petro’s administration’s pacifying approach has inadvertently hastened the territorial entrenchment of illegal armed groups, weakening the state’s governing capacity in contested regions. Amid the worst security crisis since the 2016 peace accords, the government’s failure in major demobilisation efforts risks exacerbating fiscal fragility while threatening Petro’s reform agenda and oil sector stability.
The expansion of armed groups – both in presence and ranks – has exposed the fragility of the state’s territorial control, including protection of oil infrastructure. Amid Petro’s prioritisation of peace negotiations, illegal armed groups have filled the military vacuum, to boost profits through expanded drug trafficking, illegal mining and extortion and strengthen their negotiating leverage, including via attacks on energy infrastructure. Their increasing footprint in resource-rich regions – such as Arauca and Norte de Santander departments – has undermined efforts to raise oil output to 800,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2025, likely curbing it to 750,000 bpd.
With oil comprising 20 per cent of national export revenues, a 333 per cent surge in pipeline attacks and a 2.1 per cent drop year-on-year in Q1 hydrocarbon production threaten to widen the fiscal deficit. With US$40bln in oil revenue earmarked for the country’s green energy transition, oil infrastructure disruptions jeopardise Petro’s flagship climate policy amid broader legislative gridlock. This, in turn, compounds the state’s limited capacity to counter armed groups – that are increasingly using advanced technology, including weaponised drones – raising the likelihood of protracted disruptions to the oil sector and de facto loss of governance over key enclaves.
Background
Since Petro took office, illegal armed groups have expanded into 43 per cent more municipalities, have grown by 45 per cent and have doubled their coca production. While Petro’s ‘total peace’ helped rein in high levels of violence by reducing clashes between the military and illegal armed groups, this was largely due to temporary and volatile ceasefires. The reluctance of some illegal groups to de-escalate violence led to splits within rebel groups, forcing the government into fragmented local-level negotiations and weakening prospects of major demobilisations.
As a result, inter-group violence has surged by 40 per cent since Petro took office, spilling into broader conflict. In the days before the 7 June assassination attempt on potential presidential candidate Michael Uribe, 24 coordinated bombings occurred – raising fears for electoral security ahead of August 2026 elections.
Risk outlook
As Petro’s ‘total peace’ has inadvertently bolstered illegal armed groups, efforts to contain deteriorating security conditions will likely prompt renewed military offensives. However, this approach is unlikely to significantly curb violence in the medium term – threatening the stabilisation of the oil sector and economic growth, territorial sovereignty and electoral integrity.