Date first published: 17/06/2025
Key sectors: all
Key risks: diplomatic; economic; war-on-land
Risk development
On 15 June Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs Olivier Nduhungirehe stated that the initial mid-June deadline for a peace deal between Kigali and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was indicative and that negotiations are still ongoing. This followed comments on 11 June by US Senior Bureau Official of African Affairs, Troy Fitrell, that the US is aiming to secure a peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda by the end of June or early July.
Why it matters
An accelerated timeline to achieve an agreement is made more challenging by the complexity of Kinshasa and Kigali’s history, but it serves the interests of a trade-led mediation role of the US, prior to Fitrell’s 15 July retirement, and the DRC’s desperation to regain control of its mineral-rich east. Additionally, on the line for DRC’s President Felix Tshisekedi is the prospect of substantial US investment in the extractives sector, seemingly lucrative for all participants except the state. Mounting political pressure, exacerbated by the March 23 Movement (M23) insurgency, has placed a target on Tshisekedi’s back as he fends off calls for his deposition and the re-emergence of former president and key opposition figure Joseph Kabila.
While the US has not hidden the prioritisation of its economic interests, Qatari deals in Kigali’s travel sector are also a driving force of its mediation efforts. The success of the Gulf nation’s investment in the Bugesera International Airport in Rwanda and the conclusion of securing a 49 per cent stake in the state airline RwandAir depend on lasting political stability, and for Rwanda to regain its previously polished international image. However, Kigali’s effective use of M23 and the Congo River Alliance (AFC) – the political coalition it operates under – as security and political proxies in eastern DRC has helped establish control of key cities and mining revenue, which have long been in its sights.
Background
Angola-brokered peace talks that began in 2022 yielded little by way of a path to lasting peace with Kinshasa’s reluctance to negotiate directly with M23, while Kigali and M23 stalled – with the Luanda process effectively collapsing on 14 December 2024. On 23 March, shortly after Angola relinquished its role as mediator, Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame met with the Emir of Qatar, who called for a ceasefire. In parallel, US involvement led to both sides agreeing to draft a peace agreement by 2 May. Following a tense 25 April meeting in which Kinshasa and Kigali’s foreign ministers did not shake hands, both sides agreed to respect each other’s sovereignty and refrain from providing support for non-state armed groups. While international mediation has made progress, it has faced hurdles – from delayed deadlines to broken ceasefires.
Risk outlook
Since M23’s rapid advance in the eastern provinces of the DRC, the AFC has established an administrative presence, setting up parallel governance structures, issuing infrastructure contracts to Rwandan construction firms and imposing taxes on mining sites – in part, realising their raison d’etre. Loosening their grip on the region amid the US determination to achieve an agreement by early July won’t come easily. Any significant push back from M23’s backer, Rwanda, during negotiations could threaten to derail a deal, with Fitrell stating “if we are going to do it, we do it now.” A US minerals deal hangs in the balance for Kigali, as does a lucrative partnership with Qatar. Expansive spending plans supported by external funding could also be risked by prolonging the war in eastern DRC. Together, they increase the likelihood of Rwanda being cooperative in ceasefire negotiations.